Banishing Colonial Specters: Language Ideology and Education Policy in Pakistan by Durrani, Mariam
Working Papers in Educational
Linguistics (WPEL)
Volume 27
Number 1 Spring 2012 Article 3
4-1-2012
Banishing Colonial Specters: Language Ideology
and Education Policy in Pakistan
Mariam Durrani
University of Pennsylvania
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/wpel/vol27/iss1/3
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Banishing Colonial Specters: Language Ideology and Education Policy in
Pakistan
This article is available in Working Papers in Educational Linguistics (WPEL): http://repository.upenn.edu/wpel/vol27/iss1/3
Banishing Colonial Specters: Language 
Ideology and Education Policy in Pakistan
Mariam Durrani
University of Pennsylvania
This paper examines the presence of British colonial language ideologies in Pakistan’s 
language-in-education policy and discourses. Through a review of scholarly work on official 
language policies, and a sampling of current policies and media commentary, I analyze 
how the language ideologies that undergird the language-in-education discourses are 
embedded with political, cultural, and moral projects about speakers and their languages. 
The colonial language ideologies had assumed a direct relationship between a language 
and the stereotypic characteristics of its speakers and failed to account for the multiple 
possibilities that the English medium education provided for the indigenous population, 
eventually leading to decolonization. In Pakistan’s post-independence education system, 
the positioning of English as a prestige language variety in contrast to the vernacular 
languages continues to have important consequences within Pakistan’s current domestic 
and global political context. By recognizing how top-down colonial policies failed to 
account for the resistance efforts of English-speaking Indians, I argue that current 
language-in-education policies for political and governmental purposes may continue 
to be counterproductive unless they take local knowledges and realities into account.   
If it is true that there is “no view from nowhere” when it comes to ideas about language (Irvine & Gal, 2009), then what is the position of Pakistan’s current language-in-education policy discourse with respect to its colonial history and 
multilingual context? Furthermore what can we learn from the history of  policies 
and programs that will contribute to the language-in-education dialogue so that 
the educational system is not destined to repeat its past? In this essay, I examine 
colonial and post-independence language-in-education policies in Pakistan, 
paying special attention to the overlapping of colonial and nationalist language 
ideologies, and analyze how these continue to impact Pakistan’s current language 
in education policies. By recognizing how top-down colonial policies failed to 
account for the resistance efforts of English-speaking Indians1, I argue that current 
language-in-education policies for political and governmental purposes may 
continue to be counterproductive unless they take local knowledges and realities 
into account.    
My discussion must be selective given the enormous breadth of the topic and 
the limited length of this work. I hope, however, that the arguments presented 
will have relevance to language policy discourse beyond the paper’s scope. As 
part of my theoretical framework, I use the analytical concepts of language ideology 
and discourse. Language ideology is defined as “ideas with which participants 
1 Prior to 1947, the nations now knows as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India constituted one country 
recognized as India. My reference to English-speaking Indians indexes the English-speaking segment 
of this pre-1947 Indian population. 
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and observers frame their understanding of linguistic varieties and map those 
understandings onto people, events, and activities that are significant to them” 
(Irvine & Gal, 2009, p. 402), and serves as a useful tool to examine the current 
debates, or discourses, regarding the medium of instruction (MOI) in Pakistan’s 
education system. According to Blommaert (2005), discourse consists of “all forms 
of meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural, 
historical patterns and developments of use” (p. 3). The historic debates regarding 
MOI and the related language ideologies held by multiple stakeholders can be 
most aptly understood to constitute multiple discourses on MOI in Pakistan.  He 
goes on to explain that any discourse, and also any policy, has a range of socially 
significant attributes and associated ideologies. While it is inconceivable that we 
can fashion a language policy without ideologies, it is imperative that we become 
more critically conscious of the ideologies that have informed previous language 
policies and ensure that we cease the perpetuation of language policies informed 
by colonial-era, and thus colonizing, discourses. Rather we must understand 
contemporary language practices of teachers, students, and families and then 
it may be possible to propose more contextually appropriate and empirically-
grounded language policies based on these practices. After all, languages are only 
useful insofar as people find them suitable for their communicative needs and 
language policy discourse should recognize this reality.
 Through a review of scholarly work on official language policies, and a 
sampling of current policies and media commentary, I analyze how the language 
ideologies that undergird the language-in-education discourses are embedded 
with political, cultural, and moral projects about speakers and their languages.  This 
paper examines specific official language policy and language policy discourses 
created by researchers, journalists, and other public figures, and considers the 
language ideologies that continue to inform these discourses.  One can begin this 
exploration into Pakistan’s language policies at the country’s inception in 1947, but 
in order to understand the language policy enacted at Pakistan’s independence, it 
is helpful to turn to the earlier British colonial policies in India.  After analyzing 
colonial and independence-era language in education policy, the paper turns to 
current policy initiatives and discourses.  Finally I discuss on-going efforts to create 
more effective policies and the primacy of ethnographic research in this process.
The Colonial Moment and Language Policies
Prior to 1784, the East India Company’s language policies were relatively 
tolerant since the then-purpose was to conduct trade peacefully and profitably with 
the indigenous Indian people.2 In fact, during the late 18th century, the University 
of Oxford established a professorship of Persian Studies, the official language of 
the Mughal Empire’s administration, for the “cultivation of the Persian tongue, as 
an useful attainment in such persons as are designed for the service of the East-
India company [sic]” (Rahman, [circa 18C] 2004a, p. 6).  The Orientalists in the 
Company’s leadership favored indigenization as a means of governance (Ayres, 
2  As noted, the areas now known as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India were identified under one name 
‘India’ and as one colony in the British Empire. In this paper, I follow the languages of Pakistan (Urdu, 
English, regional languages) more closely. Due to this scope, Hindi, Sanskrit, and other languages will 
not be included in the analysis. 
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2009; Viswanathan, 1989). Viswanathan (1989) explains that the British sensed that 
an “efficient Indian administration rested on an understanding of Indian culture” 
(p. 28), and so it was not uncommon for many early Company men to learn local 
languages, marry local Indian women, and even convert to local religions.  The 
1784 Pitt’s India Act changed the linguistic preference of the administrators when 
the Company came under the control of the British crown, thereafter espousing 
a more Anglicist policy. With the passage of Bentinck’s English Education Act in 
1835, English became the colonial system’s medium of instruction, “endorsing a 
new function and purpose for English instruction in the dissemination of moral 
and religious values” (p. 44). In the oft-cited Minute on Indian Education ([1835] 
n.d.), Macaulay, a proponent of Anglicist policies, argued that due to the costs 
of maintaining both vernacular and English systems of education in India, the 
Crown must choose English, emphasizing the priority of good governance over 
cultivation of indigenous languages and customs. Macaulay explained:
I feel...that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to 
educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form 
a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we 
govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in 
opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine 
the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms 
of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them 
by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the 
population. ([1835] n.d., n. p., emphasis added)
This policy to divide the Indian population into two classes—one who serve as 
interpreters, and the “millions”—manifested in two media of instruction: English 
for the elite and non-English for the larger population due to “limited means.” In 
the same Minute, he expresses his interest to “strike at the root of the bad system,” 
by ceasing the publication of Arabic and Sanskrit books and closing religious 
schools of learning. Here, we see how Macaulay’s language ideology about 
indigenous languages negates Indian religious texts and learning, specifically 
referencing Arabic, a stand-in word for Islam, and Sanskrit, for Hinduism. If the 
roots of the bad system were expunged through the removal of texts and religious 
education, the British could then replace them with a colonial and missionary 
education in English. It is noteworthy that although Macaulay nowhere mentions 
Persian in his Minute, the 1835 English Education Act and the Crown’s focus 
on English for official and administrative communication ousted Persian, the 
official and courtly language of the Mughal empire, from all administrative and 
educational functions (Rahman, 2011). Once Persian was strategically removed, 
as an attempt to eradicate Mughal symbols of power, the colonizers maintained 
English as the official language for colonial administrative functions3. Since British 
3  The Hindustani language, which preceded Hindi and Urdu, became a sort of cosmopolitan lingua 
franca within the northern and western regions of the British empire (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006; Rah-
man, 2011). For this reason, 19th century scholars, some employed by the East-India Company, regularly 
published detailed grammars on the Hindustani language (Eastwick, 1858; Forbes, 1861). While there 
are many other languages spoken in the formerly colonized area now known as Pakistan and India, the 
priority assigned to Hindustani, now Urdu and Hindi, demonstrates the usefulness it held for colonial 
administrators who wished to communicate more effectively with the local Indians. Today, Urdu and 
Hindi are recognized as two separate languages based on two orthographic systems, lexical differ-
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moral and intellectual superiority was not questioned by the colonial officers, their 
mission to create a class of interpreters, Indian only in blood and color, would 
continue unabated. As history has shown, this strategic colonizing mission would 
eventually be thwarted by many of the same interpreters (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006), 
which will be discussed later in the paper. 
Through this selected analysis of colonial language education policy, we can 
identify two emergent language ideologies. The first ideology divides Indians into 
two linguistically-defined classes—the interpreter class of English speakers and 
the millions who are not English speakers; and the second ideology assumes that 
if Indians learn English, they will behave more like British citizens and support 
the Crown, thereby equating language, thought, and behavior. Echoing Macaulay, 
Rahman (2002) explains that due to limited resources an English medium education 
remained an elite privilege, and the British supported a policy of vernacular 
education for the masses up until independence. This division of English-medium 
and vernacular-medium schooling has remained a defining characteristic of 
education in Pakistan, and arguably even within the larger subcontinent. Rahman 
(2004b) explains that there were two kinds of English-medium schools under 
British rule: Chiefs’ Colleges and English schools. Both were designed for political 
and social purposes, i.e., to encourage loyalty to the Crown and to create a class 
of civil service employees that constituted the newly emerging professional upper 
middle class, and separated from the vernacular-speaking masses. 
The prioritization of secular governance and the creation of an intermediary 
class indexes the second language ideology which emerges from colonialist 
language policies. According to Anglicist thought, if Indians learned to speak 
English and follow the associated cultural traditions, they would think more 
like the native English speakers and remain loyal to the Crown. The colonial 
policymakers imagined a “rational” directionality from language learning and 
thought to political allegiance and agentive action.  The initial Muslim reaction 
to English education follows a similar ideological position, exemplified by the 
famous religious edict, or fatwa, of Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1823) in which he 
states that there is nothing inherently wrong with Muslims learning English as 
long as it is not for the purpose of flattering the English or gaining their favor 
(Rahman, 2002).4 While Aziz’s fatwa could be interpreted as a rhetorically 
ambiguous statement, many Muslim families saw it as a clear instruction not 
to send their sons to study English; after all, in the late 18th century, there was 
little else to do with the English language in the Indian subcontinent other than 
to work under the supervision of colonial officers. Similar to the British belief 
that learning English would have moral and religious implications, the Muslim 
scholars also understood English learning to have a pre-determined communicative 
functionality. For example, some, like Aziz, argued that it would lead to a less 
cohesive Muslim community. This leads to an important ideological position 
where English education was adopted as a colonial strategy to enhance national 
unity and successful governance. In other words, students of English were not 
expected to demand independence. 
ences, and cultural references (Rahman, 2011; Rai, 1984).  
4  The initial Muslim reaction acknowledges an early understanding of the multiple possibilities of 
English usage. Later I will discuss the emergence of multiple varieties of English in Pakistan (for 
more on Pakistani English see Baumgardner, 1993; for more on English as an Islamic language, see 
Mahboob, 2009).
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We can see a link between the second language ideology and a long tradition in 
European philosophical thought which has recently been examined and critiqued 
by sociolinguist Jan Blommaert (2005).  He explains that German Romantic thinker 
Johann Gottfried Herder appropriated John Locke’s enlightenment principles that 
assumed a shared language indexes a shared culture among its speakers. Along the 
same lines, Hymes (1974) argues that the Herderian approaches separate languages 
from their socially situated use, equate the stereotypic characteristics of a given 
speech community with the language itself, and assume the social functions of a 
language to be given and universally equivalent. For example, if a Muslim person 
learns Hindi, the learning act may index or position her as a Hindu sympathizer. In 
this sense, language learning as a practice becomes emblematic and “sets defaults 
for subsequent readings of personhood” (Agha, 2007, p. 252-253). 
Macaulay’s statement designates English as the language of science and 
conveyor of knowledge, a task for which the vernacular languages were deemed 
unfit. Later in this paper, I expound on how the denigrating and negative ideologies 
ascribed to vernacular languages remain a specter of Indian colonial heritage. In 
both the colonial moment and in post-1947 Pakistan, the notion of a single language 
and its associated speech community and the simple language-equals-people 
equation fail to capture the dynamic nature of human communication both within 
a singular speech community and between communities (Ayres, 2009; Blommaert, 
2005; Hymes, 1974).  
The Crown’s hope for a passive acceptance of English rule, as well as the English 
language, was short-sighted. In 1857 Indian sepoys, or soldiers in the colonial 
army, led a major uprising also known as the First War of Independence. This 
rebellion is considered to be a major turning point in the British colonial presence 
in India (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006). The Sepoy Uprising was but the beginning of a 
long struggle for independence for India and Pakistan. Despite British maneuvers 
to delegitimate Mughal rule, including replacing Persian with English as the new 
official language, the desire for Indian independence was certainly not dependent 
on the medium of communication. How can we understand the possible reasons 
why, despite the British belief in their colonial project and strategic Anglicization 
of the education system, they were ultimately unable to avoid indigenous calls for 
independence? Despite the attempt to create “a class of persons...English in taste, 
in opinions, in morals, and in intellect” (Macaulay, [1835] n.d.), it is clear that that 
the indigenous did not remain Indian only by blood and color. The Indian National 
Congress5 convened in 1885 by a group of some seventy English-educated Indians 
to acquire more legal standing in the colonial government (Metcalf & Metcalf, 
2006). These Indians attended the very same elite, English-medium schools and 
universities that Macaulay had proposed, and many also went to London to study 
for the bar or the Civil Service. Metcalf and Metcalf (2006) explain that the initial 
cohesion of the Congress was based on these shared interests and educational 
experiences. As Bhabha (1994) would argue, the class of interpreters were “part-
objects of a metonymy of colonial desire...[who] emerge as ‘inappropriate’ colonial 
subjects” (p. 126, emphasis added). The inappropriateness of these agents led to 
the destabilization of the colonial subjectivity and altered the colonial master’s 
5  The INC (founded in 1884) was one of the most famous political parties in India. The history of INC 
presidents includes many illustrious Indian politicians including Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal 
Nehru (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006). The INC-led coalition won the 2009 Indian elections. 
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authoritative centrality (Ben Beya, n. d.). Bhabha’s theoretical contribution on 
colonial ambivalence helps illuminate how the Herderian, one nation-one language 
ideology and a top-down understanding of language instruction cannot adequately 
account for the ways that individuals learn and trope on language use for their 
own purposes (cf. Agha, 2007). In other words, while the British fervently hoped 
that an English education would remove the indigenous population’s hopes for 
independence, it can be argued that this very education significantly contributed 
to the ultimate passing of the Indian Independence Act by the British parliament 
in 1947. The Indian National Congress became “the focus of the longest-lived 
nationalist movement in the modern colonial world, [and]...was the model for 
nationalist movements elsewhere” (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2006, p. 136). It appears that 
the same interpreter class, or Macaulay’s translators, learned to use the discursive 
tools of the master, here English, and the socializing opportunities provided by 
its learning to protest the colonizer’s domination (Bhabha, 1994). Bhabha’s (1994) 
theory on mimicry and colonial ambivalence situates the subversive nature and 
consequences to English-medium education for the elite interpreter class. Once 
indigenous English speakers began not only flattering the British in English but 
also communicating with each other (in both English and vernacular languages), 
we can see how the very colonial education designed to create a class of Indians 
who would resemble the British became more of a “menace,” leading to colonial 
rupture and not colonial solidarity (p. 126). 
Here we see an instance of how a top-down, colonial language policy and 
its associated language ideologies may have actually backfired since the local 
contexts and actors were not understood or included in the policy-making process. 
The British were surely unaware of the private conversations between Indian ex-
patriates studying in London, but it appears these private moments accumulated 
and transformed into a forum to express political desires, leading to the Indian 
independence movement.  
Recycling Colonial Language Ideologies after Independence
The Indian Muslim leaders were working alongside their Hindu counterparts 
in the Indian National Congress (INC) to attain independence for India as 
one undivided nation (Jalal, 1985). Prior to August 1947, the Muslim faction had 
envisioned an India that would have included Pakistan and Bangladesh in a single 
nation-state. Early that year, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, also known as the founder 
of Pakistan, proposed the possibility of a homeland for Indian Muslims to the 
INC as a bargaining strategy, in order to obtain more political rights and power 
for Muslims in an undivided India. When this strategy did not yield the desired 
results and the Congress Party did not acquiesce to the Muslim League’s demands 
in the years before Independence, Pakistan was forged into existence through the 
violent and traumatic Partition from India (Jalal, 1985). As a result, Pakistan’s early 
nationalist identity was positioned as counter to Indian nationalist identity. This 
division was evident in the language ideologies that Indian Muslim nationalists 
and Indian Hindu nationalists ascribed to their respective languages (for more on 
the Hindi public sphere, see Orsini, 2002). The status of Urdu as the Indian Muslim 
language became part of the rallying cry for an independent Muslim state (Ayres, 
2009; Rai, 1984). Rahman (2002) explains that Muslim scholars came to see Urdu as 
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an Islamic language and that “one of the major changes in Muslim consciousness...
was because of the adoption of print by the Indian ulema [or Indian Muslim 
scholars]” (p. 220). The increasing popularity of Urdu print became part of the 
Muslim leaders’ political strategy to communicate and garner support within their 
communities. In this case Urdu language practices, specifically the use of Nastiliq 
script which is aesthetically similar to the same script found in the Quran, leads to 
an ideology of Urdu being seen as more emblematic of Islam and being Muslim; 
while the same grammatical system when written in the Devanagari script, or 
the script used for Sanskrit and Hindu texts, is thought to be a Hindu emblem. 
Rahman (2011) explicates the shared history of Urdu and Hindi and discusses 
how the processes of Sanskritization for Hindi and Arabization for Urdu became 
indexical markers for contrasting religious identities. These religious affiliations 
have continued to inform the language ideologies of both Hindi and Urdu6. The 
premise of Pakistan’s independence, as a homeland for Indian Muslims7, hinged 
on its religious and linguistic difference from India. Ideologically speaking, the 
post-1947 discourse of Urdu as a symbol for Indian-Muslim unity recycles the 
earlier colonial ideologies where language indexes not only national unity but also 
moral positionality (cf. Ayres, 2009; Rahman, 2002).
Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan consisted of two regions—West Pakistan, 
which is present-day Pakistan, and East Pakistan, which is present-day 
Bangladesh—separated geographically by 1100 miles.  Many of the nation-state’s 
new leaders came from largely Urdu-speaking provinces and devised a language 
policy based on a “project to forge a Pakistani ethnicity through the cultural heritage 
of the Urdu language” (Ayres, 2009, p. 6). During a 1948 public meeting in Dhaka, 
the capital of former East Pakistan and now present-day Bangladesh, Pakistan’s 
founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah told the audience that, while the Bengali language 
may well be the provincial language:
the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other lan-
guage. Any one who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. 
Without one State language, no nation can remain tied up solidly togeth-
er and function. (Jinnah, [1948] 2000, p.150)
Pakistani leaders’ emphasis on the role of a common language shares similar 
epistemological assumptions as the Crown, namely that speakers of the same 
speech community would consider themselves compatriots of a united nation 
and therefore easier to govern through one state language (Ayres, 2009). This 
statement also illustrates the development of Urdu as a linguistic emblem of 
national identity and any identification of a non-Urdu language with Pakistan is 
deemed a treasonous act. Jinnah’s statement also carries the weight of Herderian 
thought where once again language is linked to the unity and strength of a nation. 
In January 1952, governor-general Khwaja Nizammudin defended Jinnah’s Urdu-
6  The fact remains that most speakers across cities in Pakistan and North India speak a mutually intel-
ligible language variety, often referred to by linguists as Hindi-Urdu (Rahman, 2011). In this paper, I use 
Hindi-Urdu and Urdu-Hindi interchangeably to further emphasize the similarities between the two 
language varieties as well as to discursively resist the tendency to order the primacy of Hindi over Urdu.
7 My reference to “Indian Muslims” indexes the identificatory label many Muslim members in the Indi-
an independence movement used to advance the interests of Muslims in the movement. For example in 
1906, a group of elite Muslims created the All-India Muslim League in Dhaka (Metcalf &Metcalf,  2006)
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only position, sparking student-led protests in Dhaka, leading to a number of 
student deaths and, as some would argue, the beginnings of Bengali nationalism 
(Ayres, 2009; Rahman, 2004a). Subsequently in 1955 the central government 
adopted a one-unit and dual language policy8 (Ayres, 2009; Bose & Jalal, 1998). In 
order to design a more inclusive governance strategy for the fledgling two-part 
nation-state, the 1956 constitution9 declared both Bengali and Urdu as national 
languages for East Pakistan and West Pakistan respectively, while English 
remained the official language. However the imbalance between power of East 
and West Pakistan persisted since the nation’s capital was in West Pakistan, 
where the majority of government officials spoke Urdu, or even Punjabi, but not 
Bengali. To be fair, language policy is but one aspect of the complex political, 
social, and economic factors that led to Bangladesh’s eventual independence in 
1971, but language issues certainly sowed the seeds of discontent in both the East 
and West Wings. 
The one-unit policy created an imbalance of representation within the West 
Wing since Punjab had the largest population and overwhelmed Sindh, Balochistan 
and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (Ayres, 2009).  Following Bangladesh’s independence, 
Pakistan’s current constitution (1973) delineates the national language as Urdu 
and the official language as English; the latter was described as a temporary policy. 
The 1973 Constitution was promulgated with Article 251 stating:
1. The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be 
made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years 
from the commencing day.
2. Subject to clause (1), the English language may be used for official purposes 
until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu. 
3. Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial 
Assembly may by law prescribe measure[s] for the teaching, promotion 
and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language. 
The Constitution recognizes the need to continue English for official purposes 
until “arrangements” can be made for its replacement. The writers also appreciated 
the plurality of vernacular languages and left it to the discretion of provincial 
assemblies to take up the matter.  In both the pre- and post-partition eras, the 
geographic area known as Pakistan has had a rich plurilingual environment. Nearly 
every province and its spoken language(s)–Balochi and Brahvi in Balochistan, Pashto 
in Pukhtunkhwa Khyber, Siraiki and Punjabi in Punjab, among others–remained 
officially unrecognized in language-in-education policies, with the exception of 
Sindhi in Sindh which has resumed its de jure status as a MOI. Furthermore with 
more than 60 languages spoken in Pakistan, many ethnic-separatist movements 
continue to center around their respective languages as a rallying cry for political 
8  In 1955, the Pakistan Assembly passed a bill declaring all the areas and provinces in the West Wing 
to be “one unit,” while the East Wing were a second unit. Under this bill, the provincial governments 
of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and North West Frontier Province were dissolved. Leaders hoped this 
would do away with provincial prejudices and reduce administrative expenditures. The one-unit poli-
cy was dissolved in 1970 by General Yahya Khan (Bose & Jalal, 1998). 
9  The Government of India Act of 1935 was used as an interim constitution by both India and Pakistan 
until they wrote their own. It did not express an explicit language policy (Ayres, 2009). The 1956 Paki-
stani Constitution replaced this interim constitution. 
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autonomy10 (cf. Ayres, 2009; Rahman, 2010a). Compared to the Bangladeshi riots 
of 1971, there was a less violent reaction to the 1973 declaration of Urdu as the 
national language, although regional language movements continued to resist this 
imposition. These vociferous language movements have resisted the Urdu-centric 
cultural practices throughout Pakistan’s history, particularly in Sindhi-speaking, 
Siraiki-speaking, Pashto-speaking, and Balochi-speaking communities (Ayres, 
2009; Rahman, 2002). The non-Urdu-speaking population believed the leaders 
wished to suppress ethnic identity and rally the public around a constructed 
national identity supplemented by an imposed single national language (Rahman, 
2004b). In this sense, we see a similar language ideology to the colonial era, where 
Pakistan’s leaders assume that a single national language will encourage national 
unity and efficient governance. These status policy efforts to unite Pakistani 
citizens under one language have been fraught with politics and conflict (cf. Ayres, 
2009; Huizinga, 1994; Oldenburg, 1985; Peshkin, 1962; Shackle, 1977).
Similar to the colonial policy where English was not for all Indians but only 
a selected elite, Pakistan’s education system perpetuated this division between 
English-medium education for the elite and Urdu-medium education for the rest. 
The ideological division along class differences continues to characterize English 
speakers and non-English speakers. Rahman (2004b) argues that Pakistan’s current 
educational institutions designate class along the lines of English proficiency 
or lack thereof. The Pakistani elite attend English-medium education, typically 
private schools and universities, while the working classes attend Urdu-medium 
public schools and public universities, and the very poor and rural, mostly 
male, youth attend Urdu-medium, or perhaps Arabic-medium, madrassah, or 
traditional Islamic, education. Rahman explains that the educational apartheid 
has made class disparities more acute and that the class-based education policies 
are part of the state’s discriminatory practices against the marginalized non-elite. 
Of course, many factors, other than language-in-education policy, contribute to 
the state’s mismanagement of education policies and their implementation. Such 
claims by Rahman and others ask that scholars devote more attention and care to 
understanding the weaknesses of the current system and the complex history that 
has shaped it before proposing any more programs that only exacerbate the current 
dilemma while prioritizing governance and marginalizing the public’s daily 
realities.  Furthermore, if the majority of Pakistanis do not claim Urdu or English, 
as their first language, this leads to the exclusion of “linguistic communities from 
education because they do not understand the language used in school” (Coleman, 
2010, p. 23). The divisive repercussions of not addressing the local communicative 
practices relates to the current political instability and conflict, running contrary to 
the state’s goals of good governance.  
It seems that neither the British colonizers nor Pakistan’s political leaders 
sought to maintain the elements of the area’s linguistic diversity in national 
language policies. Perhaps similar to the Crown, the state determined multilingual 
language-in-education policies would be disadvantageous for political expediency 
and strategic governance. For example, in 1990 Benazir Bhutto’s government 
proposed the Balochistan Mother Tongue Use bill which mandated the use of 
10  According to the 1998 Census, only 7.57% of approximately 132 million Pakistanis claim Urdu as 
a mother tongue, while 87.77% claim one of the following: Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Pashto, or Balochi 
(Government of Pakistan, 1998). 
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Balochi, Brahvi, and Pashto in public, or non-elite, schools, exempting elite English 
medium schools from this language policy. However, in 1992 Nawaz Sharif’s 
representative in Balochistan passed an amendment to this bill making the policy 
“optional” (Ayres, 2009). The specific political reasons why these governments 
disagreed over their support for Balochi language education cannot erase the 
general lack of interest, commitment, and political will evident in language policies 
that do not account for non-Urdu, non-English localized language practices. The 
continued existence and official backing of a Macaulay-esque “class” of elite, 
English speakers who are protected from the, albeit short-lived, Balochi language 
policy is indicative of the continued prestige and valorization given to English 
compared with any and all other languages. As discussed earlier however, despite 
the official colonial language policy, there was an undercurrent of communicative 
activity that led to a major political and social upheaval in the subcontinent. The 
question that remains is whether current Pakistani scholars and policymakers will 
continue the top-down education language policy that fails to account for locally-
informed communicative practices or if they are willing to change this paradigm. 
Post 9/11 Shifts in Language Ideologies
Today, the instability of the Pakistani political infrastructure as well as geo-
political and domestic problems (i.e., the US War on Terror, extremism, corruption, 
lack of adequate power resources, and yearly droughts and floods in a largely 
agrarian economy) take center stage in most domestic debates. In Pakistan, where 
30% of the population is said to be living in “extreme educational poverty”11 and 
63% percent is under the age of 25 (UNESCO, 2010; UNDP, 2011), it is crucial that 
stakeholders in both the public and private sectors address the needs of the current 
educational crisis and invigorate the dialogue with fresh ideas. If more than half 
of Pakistan’s population is currently under 25, the need to understand how young 
people are socialized as Pakistani citizens and as global citizens takes on great 
urgency. Simultaneous to the Pakistani Prime Minister’s declaration of 2011 as 
the “Year of Education,” there has been a renewed interest among policymakers, 
researchers, and the media to examine the existing language education programs 
and policies and to suggest proposals for improving the country’s education 
system (cf. Lyon & Edgar, 2010; Mustafa, 2011; Rahman, 2011). 
To address these complex problems, it is useful to draw lessons from past 
attempts at education policy.  It almost goes without saying that the historical 
events have shaped the post 9/11 moment we find ourselves in. Sociolinguists 
and educationists (e.g., Ayres, 2009; Hayes, 1987; Mansoor, 1993, 2005; Rahman, 
1996, 2002, 2004b) have analyzed efforts by earlier colonial and Pakistani state 
governments to design language policies and have critiqued the nationalist 
and religious ideologies about language informing these mandates. From a 
methodological point of view, many of these studies on language programs and 
policies are primarily based on textual analysis of historical documents and events 
or draw from survey-based research. In other words, the bias of the research 
methodology is likely to gloss over the underlying social processes taking place 
in schools and universities. Without a more reflexive understanding of how we 
11  UNESCO defines individuals living in “extreme educational poverty” as those with two or fewer 
years of education.
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are positioned within these ideological labyrinths, it becomes difficult to remove 
colonial ideologies from contemporary language policies. In this section, I analyze 
current language policy discourse to understand how older language policies have 
continued to influence the discourse and what is not currently being included in 
the dialogue.   
At the higher education level, all universities maintain a standard language 
policy that instruction and assessment must be in English (Higher Education 
Commission, n.d.), with the implicit assumption that English is used exclusively 
for communication in classrooms and for general academic discourse. As 
espoused by the Higher Education Commission (HEC), the symbolic capital of 
English for non-English speakers in terms of employment and economic mobility 
is well documented and understood (Mansoor, 2005; Mustafa, 2011; Rahman, 
2002, 2005). In a public address to an American university audience, Rahman 
(2005) explains that these individuals are “unable or unwilling to overcome the 
obstacle of English to get a decent job in society”12 (p. 23). The belief that education 
systems should be designed to support the market and that the development 
of human capital increases a nation’s ability to participate in the global market 
manifests in the priority ascribed to English medium education by many students 
and families (for more on human capital theory, see Patrinos, 2000; Schultz, 1971). 
The emblematic nature of English is as a means of self improvement that leads to 
greater possibilities of career advancement, but more importantly it seems that 
earning power is eclipsed by a correlation with secularism and democracy and an 
inverse relationship with terrorism and militancy. Rahman (2005) explains:
[Pakistan] is now a frontline state helping the United States fight terror-
ism. At the same time its education system has the potential to create ter-
rorists. English is relevant in this context because students who are least 
exposed to it appear to be most supportive of intolerant and militant values. 
(p. 3, emphasis added) 
This statement presents a more recent shift in language ideology regarding 
English from the historical ideology where English-speaker portended elite and 
prestige status to English as an indicator of non-militancy. Rahman’s reference to 
the education system having the potential of “creating” individuals who support 
intolerant and militant values aligns with his earlier critique (1996, 2004b) of the 
economic and social disparity produced by an educational system divided by 
medium of instruction. Rahman (2005) goes on to discuss the potential implications 
of English discourses within Pakistan:
English is also the window to the outside world and has discourses with 
liberal, democratic values which do have the potential of changing male-
dominating, macho values from Pakistani traditional sub-cultures. It can 
also act as a moderating influence against the influence of religious ex-
tremists who are intolerant of points of view different from their own or 
of womens’ empowerment and liberation. (p. 23)
Compared to the first quote, Rahman bifurcates the English discourse into two 
main perspectives: (1) the power to discourage militant and intolerant attitudes 
12  I assume that “decent job” means a well-paying position.at some kind of socially acceptable estab-
lishment and/or institution.
40
WPEL VOLumE 27, NumbEr 1
and (2) the possibility of a more liberalizing and moderate ethos. English use in 
Pakistan now becomes associated with two kinds of English speakers who espouse 
two language ideologies. One ideology references the elite English speakers, 
formerly part of the interpreter class, who are “alienated from and indifferent to 
the rest of their compatriots from less privileged socio-economic classes” (Rahman, 
2005, p. 23). He goes on to explain that since these less-privileged compatriots are 
not exposed “to any discourses created in other societies, it is easy for discourses 
produced by religious fundamentalists, cultural chauvinists and others to dominate 
their minds” (p. 23). Rahman (2005) explains that this bifurcation is connected to 
the same two-tiered educational system where the teaching and use of English is 
accompanied by the inculcation of liberal and modern values. Mahboob (2009) takes 
another perspective where he explains how English in Pakistan “reflects Islamic 
values and embodies South Asian Islamic sensitivities” (p. 175). While I abhor 
the recent trend in the media to equate Islamic practice and extremism, I become 
concerned with ideological relationships between Islamic ways of thinking and 
the English language. It is imperative that researchers understand the explicit and 
implicit consequences of such ideological positioning and investigate what it is that 
people actually do with their English, Urdu and other communicative resources. 
Rahman’s discourse seems similar to Coleman’s (2010) review of English 
language teaching policies and practices in Pakistan, where Coleman acknowledges 
that English has a gate keeping role and that many students of English see their 
education as a means to an end. While this is not surprising, both of these authors 
cannot account for the daily lived communicative English literary practices since 
the focus seems to be on a top-down, social engineering agenda. Both Rahman’s 
emphasis on the moderating influence of English and Coleman’s report, written 
at the behest of the British Council and the Government of Pakistan to understand 
the importance of English as a “tool for individual and national development” 
(Wazir Ali, cited in Coleman, n. p.) embody an interest in understanding how 
English can be taught to better the educational system and consequently the 
sociopolitical environment in Pakistan. In a post 9/11 world, where Pakistan and 
its majority Muslim population are discussed frequently in the context of the 
US War on Terror, it is understandable why researchers would want to imagine 
a relationship between English-medium education and non-militancy or as a 
means to create a more equitable reality. Lyon (2010) takes a contrary approach 
to such “education as panacea” ideology. He argues that “if educational reforms 
are meant to raise national literacy...it may behove the state to comply with 
community expectations, even if they may be contradictory to what an indigenous 
urban minority elite or external donor may think is appropriate” (p. 17). He goes 
on to propose that education reforms should not be “a disguised form of social 
engineering to correct existing inequalities between genders or classes,” (p. 27) but 
a more locally informed set of practices which includes community members in 
the policy-making process. 
The recent ideological connection in regards to English language as a modern, 
secular language indexes a recycled revision of older language ideologies. English 
was originally designated as the communicative medium for Macaulay’s interpreter 
class, but it had a subversive role in the processes of colonial ambivalence and 
became a medium through which the Indian elite propelled decolonization. In 
Rahman’s statement, we see an instance where English has became ideologically 
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linked to liberalism and modernity, and in opposition to extremism. Rahman 
(2005) claims that those who are exposed to it, most likely through some kind of 
schooling experience, may become less extremist in their thinking. Urdu speakers 
are ideologically positioned in contrast to English speakers where Urdu is seen 
as a non-elite language variety, void of prestige, and related to extremism. In 
her survey-based study, Mansoor (1993) finds that male and female students 
studying in both Urdu and English medium schools rated English speakers to be 
more cultured, mannered, intelligent, educated, and capable than Urdu speakers. 
Rahman (2004b) explains that English-medium students hold Urdu-medium 
students in open contempt and describe them as paendoo13 [‘rustic’] as a term of 
derision. He describes the English-medium students to have only one redeeming 
feature: “their support for liberal-humanist values,...human rights, democracy, 
and freedom” which they eventually lose when they become functionaries of 
the state (p. 71). Such statements seem rife with conflicting language ideologies 
and the ideological shifts, from colonial ideologies to the present, demand more 
empirically grounded research to explore their significance and implications for 
contemporary social and educational processes. While scholars have conducted 
large and small-scale quantitative-based surveys to understand the educational 
system’s deficiencies and students’ needs (Coleman, 2010; Lyon, 2010; Mansoor, 
1993, 2005; Rahman, 2002), these studies have contributed to our understanding 
of the needs of contemporary educational context but more qualitative research 
is necessary, especially to understand the systemic reasons for the deficiencies of 
the educational system and what kinds of locally contextualized language policies 
would be most desirable looking forward. 
 Making the Case for Empirically-based Language-in-Education Policy 
Finally I turn to recent national discourses concerning language education 
beginning with the National Education Policy of 2009 and analyze them in 
conjunction with other language policy proposals by researchers, multilateral 
agencies, and Pakistani public figures. Due to the recent national attention to improve 
Pakistan’s educational system, particularly given the large youth population in a 
region marred by conflict, the Prime Minister, along with the UK government, 
mandated a national initiative to support the implementation of the National 
Education Policy (NEP) of 2009 through the efforts of the Pakistan Education Task 
Force (PETF). The government recognized Pakistan’s previous failures to implement 
policy and prioritizes the goals of providing greater access and raising education 
quality. The PETF “signals a renewed commitment by the Government of Pakistan 
to deliver on policy pledges and to be held accountable for bringing about change” 
(Pakistan Education Task Force, n.d.). Item #21 of the National Education Policy 
(NEP) of 2009 explains that while English is an international language necessary 
for competition in a globalized world, Urdu is the language that “connects people 
13  The word paendoo is etymologically related to the Punjabi word pind for a rural village or settle-
ment. Someone who is referred to as paendoo is from a pind. While it may seem ironic that the English-
speaking students use an Urdu word to metapragmatically reference Urdu-speakers, I propose that 
this kind of cross-exchange and mixing between English and Urdu registers and sensibilities indexes 
the existence of hybrid register formations known by both English-speakers and Urdu-speakers. I hope 
to follow this line of reasoning in my current research projects with urban Pakistani youth and their 
hybrid registers and multi-modal communicative practices
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across Pakistan and is a symbol for national cohesion and integration” (Ministry 
of Education, 2009, p. 4). The policy asserts simultaneously Pakistan’s investment 
in English education to compete internationally as well as its position as a modern 
nation-state united by a symbolic language. Since English is described as necessary 
only as far as international purposes are concerned, the Urdu (language)-as-Pakistan 
ideology survives intact. The 2009 NEP highlights the need for children to learn 
“English as a subject” from Class I to Class V and then stipulates that all instruction 
must be in only English from Class V onwards (p. 20). The assumption is that after 
taking English as a subject for four years, students will acquire enough academic 
proficiency to enter English-medium schooling. How this can be accomplished in 
such a short time frame in a country where English is spoken by a very small and 
elite population is left unanswered. The current Educational Task Force may want 
to reconsider whether it is possible, given Pakistan’s educational system’s financial 
constraints and qualified instructional staff limitations, to pursue the goal of being 
seen as a modern, English-speaking nation, united by a single national language. 
None of Pakistan’s vernacular languages are mentioned by name in the NEP 2009, 
with the exception of Urdu. These two related but seemingly incompatible goals–
to look modern while remaining united as a nation–do not adequately address the 
obstacles faced by students and teachers to achieve academic success expected by 
the government. 
 The language policy sections of the National Education Policy 2009 appear 
to be a posturing rhetorical device to interested development agencies outside 
of Pakistan and could arguably not manifest in any real implementation plan. 
The proposal for four years of English-as-a-subject learning is not grounded in 
any research study to explain why this would be sufficient for students to enter 
English-medium schooling.  In a longitudinal study on bilingual education 
(BE) in the United States, Ramirez et al. (1991) found that regardless of the kind 
of bilingual education program, whether it was a strong form of BE (like dual 
bilingual education) or a weak form (like early-exit transitional BE), it took non-
English speaking students five or more years to acquire academic proficiency 
in English. In another study, Hakuta, Butler, and Witt (2000) concluded that it 
could take four to seven years for most students to attain proficiency in English, 
depending on whether it was oral proficiency or included academic criteria. While 
the educational programs in Pakistan and the United States are very different, 
as are the national contexts, I refer to these findings to make the point that 
immigrant, non-English speaking students in America take anywhere between 
four and seven years to become fluent in English, and this is in a context where the 
teacher, administrators, and other students are most likely fluent English speakers. 
Many immigrant students in America are surrounded by examples of English 
communication in their neighborhood, playgrounds, and media. The NEP 2009 
is proposing that students in Pakistan, of particular concern those coming from 
non-English speaking households, should be able to “pick up” English in subject 
courses after four years and then go on to only English-medium classrooms. 
Rahman’s dismay in the two-tiered system seems appropriate considering the 
lack of empirical proof for why four years would be sufficient in a multilingual 
country, like Pakistan, where students may likely be speaking two or three other 
non-English languages outside of school. Coleman (2010) explains that while the 
NEP 2009 extends the role of English medium instruction and the desire to reduce 
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social stratification is commendable, “it does not necessarily imply that English 
should be used as a medium of instruction. In fact a persuasive argument has 
been made that this ‘democratising’ approach may ultimately lead to widespread 
illiteracy, rather than literacy, in general and particularly in English” (p. 19).
 I argue that upon analysis, it becomes clear that the NEP’s position on language 
policy as a posturing device rhetorically points to the state’s interest in making 
English-medium education more accessible, but without any serious political will 
or intellectual commitment to the endeavor. Furthermore if Pakistani policymakers 
are primarily speaking to development agencies and international audiences, the 
priority given to non-localized education objectives and requirements of the global 
economy seems equally evident and problematic for the Pakistani schoolchildren 
and their families who will be affected by the policies. Recently several scholars 
and writers have suggested proposals to address education policy within Pakistan 
(Khalique, 2007; Lyon & Edgar, 2010; Mansoor 2005; Mustafa, 2011; Rahman, 
2010a). Tariq Rahman (2010a) and Sabiha Mansoor (2005) argue for an additive 
form of bilingual education that appreciates the linguistic diversity in Pakistan 
while recognizing the utility and importance of Urdu and English competency. 
Similar to Rahman (2010a), the columnist Haris Khalique (2007) argues that while 
English-medium education is the official stance of public education in Pakistan, 
and although Urdu is seen as a bridge to acquiring English competency, if we were 
to compare the kind of English-medium education available to the elite population 
through private schools to the English-medium education found in most urban 
and rural public schools, we would find tremendous disparity, exemplifying a 
high degree of social and class inequalities prevalent in Pakistani society. 
Several Pakistani public figures have proposed that if these inequities cannot 
be addressed perhaps Pakistan should do away with English-medium education 
altogether (Khalique, 2007; Mustafa, 2011). This rather extreme view represents 
the more ideology-based policy proposals, without enough understanding of local 
knowledges and practices, circulating in the Pakistani and international media. 
Mustafa (2011) proposes that the language of the home environment, or mother 
tongue, be the MOI until grade 7 when it can remain the mother tongue or change 
to Urdu. At the 11th grade level, students can choose either English or Urdu (p. 
151). Such top-down approaches to language education are contrary to many of 
the international studies on bilingual education where scholars emphasize the 
importance of community and parental support to ensure bilingual education 
program success (cf. Bartlett & Garcia, 2011). Neither Mustafa (2011), Khalique 
(2007), nor Rahman (2010a) offer specific plans for how such national program 
policies can be enacted. Many of these authors seem to be responding to language 
ideology-based policies from the past often with an un-reflexive understanding of 
their own language ideologies. For example, Mustafa, a Karachi-based journalist, 
states that “English has become a prop for Pakistan to project itself as a state 
trying to reform itself and emerge as a modern society” (2011, p. 161). In one 
moment, she has ideologically linked the state’s support for English as part of 
an insincere attempt to appear modern and so one wonders how the state can 
genuinely make a case for support of English to participate in global markets 
without seeming disingenuous.14  
14  Mustafa’s (2012) comments gained international traction when she wrote a similar article titled 
“Pakistan ruined by language myth” for the British online version of The Guardian newspaper.
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In contrast, Mansoor (2005) conducted an extensive mixed methods case 
study on language planning in Pakistan to examine whether students received 
sufficient linguistic support in Urdu, English or the mother tongue to achieve 
academic success. Her work is remarkable in that, contrary to many other policy 
proposals, her suggestions are grounded in an empirical study that includes the 
voices of students, teachers, parents and other stakeholders. She also recognizes 
that there are multiple Englishes circulating in the Pakistani educational sphere 
and encourages more communicative language teaching pedagogies (such as 
English for Specific Purposes (ESP), English for Academic Purposes (EAP), and 
English for Science and Technology (EST)) and suggests that “overseas experts” 
be consulted at all stages in developing ESP methods (p. 362). Although Mansoor 
argues for a “bottom-up” approach to language planning (p. 353), her proposal for 
language teaching with overseas consultants seems to undermine the possibilities 
of local knowledge and participation. Such a top-down development of Centers for 
English Language (CELs) may be contrary to the task of language education that 
reflects the daily communicative practices in classrooms unless teachers are taught 
the benefit of employing ethnographic research within their classrooms to adapt 
literacy education for the specific students they teach (cf. Nabi et al., 2009; Street, 
2001). It is necessary to further Mansoor’s work and explore more ethnographic 
approaches to language teaching that incorporate online technologies and media. 
In Emerging Issues in TEFL: Challenges in Asia, Nesi (2009) and Khan (2009) explore 
how ESP pedagogy can be informed by technology and the implications for 
communicative language teaching (CLT) in computer mediated communication. 
Such work is indicative of an important dialogue emerging among scholars within 
Pakistan, and it is imperative that these efforts continue and be relayed back to 
policymaking circles at the state level and private-NGO level.
I propose that only by developing our understanding of localized 
communicative practices and their associated ideologies in formal and informal 
spaces of learning through more ethnographic approaches will we be able to 
understand the globalized lives and nuanced realities faced by the Pakistani youth. 
For example, the exponential use and popularity of cell phone technology has 
helped more non-English speaking users to learn and use the Roman alphabet, 
through texting in Roman Urdu or Roman Punjabi. World Bank education 
specialist Michael Trucano (2011) describes pilot-research projects with local 
college students to understand how text messaging services can be maximized for 
educational purposes. In Pakistan, the popularity of SMS communication, which 
uses the Roman alphabet, has immense implications for the diversity of Roman 
Urdu, Roman Punjabi, Roman Sindhi, and the like communicative practices. 
Such instances are further proof that education and language education policies 
designed at the bureaucratic governmental level and passed down to classrooms 
may not be meeting the needs of students, if they ever did. Mustafa remarks upon 
the annoying presence of Urlish, “an ugly combination of Urdu and English,” in 
Urdu TV talk shows and blames the education system for this phenomena (p. xi). 
Her disappointment for the dearth of linguistic purism in classrooms where the 
students may not be required to speak English outside of the school is not surprising 
given that her language policy proposals are not based on classroom-based or 
youth-based studies. As scholars have explained about the multiple varieties of 
English present in Pakistan (Baumgardener, 1993; Mahboob, 2009; Rahman, 2004b), 
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it is not shocking that multiple Urdu varieties, often spoken by the youth, exist and 
that these varieties circulate in urban Pakistan through mediatized discourses. In 
fact, Rahman‘s (2010b) presentation at the TEDx Lahore event, titled “Who’s afraid 
of Urdish and Urdi?” demonstrates an acknowledgement of these varieties, where 
Urdish references mixing Urdu and English and Urdi, a mixing of Urdu and Hindi. 
However since Urdu is ideologically positioned as inferior or not useful to acquire 
English competency, there has been little research on the actual Urdu communicative 
practices of youth either in or out of school. In Mansoor’s (2005) study, she reports 
on predominance of mixing Urdu and English in classroom practices, although this 
phenomena does not inform her language policy proposals (p. 307). While there is 
a negative connotation ascribed in media and scholarship about mixing language 
varieties, the occurrence of such mixing can hardly be denied (Rahman, 2010b). In 
my forthcoming research, I intend to explore the dynamic communicative practices 
of young people through mediatized discourse to inform our understanding of 
language education and language socialization, and perhaps to design a more 
localized language-in-education policy. 
While most of the scholars find the linguistic diversity of Pakistan to be indicative 
of rich and vibrant cultures and communities, they are more hesitant to recognize 
the place of the mixing of these varieties in the educational sphere. Pennycook 
(2010) explains that the “current approaches to diversity, multilingualism, and so 
forth all too often start with the enumerative strategy of counting languages and 
romanticizing a plurality based on these putative language counts” (p. 63). But how 
do we incorporate this information when it comes to language-in-education policy? 
How can we address the needs of the national leaders and their strategies of good 
governance with the reflexive understanding of the extent to which languages, 
and their associated ideologies, are “inventions of the disciplines that make them” 
(p. 64)? I propose that in order to better understand the kinds of language-in-
education policy that may benefit non-elite Pakistani students, the first step would 
be to support more empirically and ethnographically informed research studies that 
focus on localized and diverse communicative practices in both urban and rural 
classrooms (Canagarajah, 2005). It appears premature to recommend a definitive 
language policy without more critical understandings of the language ideologies 
that have informed earlier policies. Rahman’s discussion (2005) about the ideologies 
associated with English and Urdu since 9/11 certainly points us in the direction 
where language-identity-nation cannot be thought of as fused into one synthesized 
language policy. Rather, researchers must recognize the multi-dimensional 
communicative repertoires of students, teachers, and families and make room for 
these pluralities in the school experiences. That may mean multiple language policies 
for different regions and cities, but this should not be a cause for alarm that Pakistani 
students will no longer identify with a monolingual nation-state, if such a thing ever 
existed. Rather a language policy that accepts and makes room for superdiverse 
repertoires (Blommaert, 2011) may actually be a productive move in terms of 
reducing economic instability and increasing national and regional security. If we 
understand the ideologies that inform language education as socially constructed 
and politically charged, then it becomes vital that we trace how these ideologies are 
formed and enacted in everyday practice so that policy recommendations actually 
respond directly to daily realities of the population addressed, and resist recycling 
outdated colonialist language ideologies of the past. 
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